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Upskirting, BitCoin, and Crime, Oh My: Judicial Resistance 
to Applying Old Laws to New Crimes – What is a 
Legislature to Do? 
MICHAEL WHITEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
As technology continues to advance at a break-neck speed, legislatures often find 
themselves scrambling to write laws to keep up with these advances. Prosecutors are 
frequently faced with the prospect of charging a defendant with a crime based on an 
existing law that does not quite fit the circumstances of the defendant’s actions. 
Judges, cognizant of the fact that legislatures, and not the judiciary, have the primary 
responsibility for creating crimes, have pushed back. Judges routinely refuse to 
convict a defendant if the statute does not fairly criminalize the defendant’s actions. 
To determine if a defendant’s actions fit within a criminal statute, judges look to the 
plain meaning of the statute, often relying on dictionaries and other interpretive tools, 
because legislative histories are scant at the state level, in an attempt to discern if the 
law covers the defendant’s actions. If the plain meaning will not encompass the 
“new” crime, judges often send a message to the legislature: by refusing to convict, 
that message is that it is time to draft a new law. This Article through an analysis of 
some recent cases, reviews the current state of affairs, looking at how the judiciary 
attempts to address “new” crimes when defendants are charged under “old” laws. It 
is hoped that this Article will encourage legislatures to act to curb “new tech” 
criminal behavior without relying on the courts to try and fit new crimes into old 
laws. 
I.  BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
In 2010, a defendant in Boston was arrested for allegedly secretly photographing 
or videotaping a person “who [was] nude or partially nude” in violation of 
Massachusetts law.1 The defendant’s actions, known as “upskirting,” involved 
surreptitiously aiming “his cellular telephone camera at the crotch area of a seated 
female passenger and attempt[ing] secretly to photograph or videotape a visual image 
of the area . . . .”2  
The prosecutor charged the defendant under the existing “Peeping Tom” statute3 
because that was the only criminal statute that appeared to cover this activity. The 
defendant did not deny engaging in the accused-of activity, rather, defense counsel 
relied on a tried-and-true defense: the statutory language did not encompass the 
activity the defendant was accused of undertaking. 
 
 
 *  Professor of Practice and Associate Dean of Library Services, University of 
Cincinnati College of Law. The author would like to thank his research assistant, Justin Wayne 
JD ’19 Chase College of Law, for his invaluable assistance in researching this paper. 
 1. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 105(b) (2014). 
 2. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 523 (Mass. 2014). 
 3. ch. 272, § 105(b). 
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When the case arrived at the Supreme Judicial Court, the Court tried its best to 
examine the current law and determine how it might fit the accused’s actions. In the 
end, the Court found, as many other similarly-situated courts have found, that the 
prosecution’s rationale for wanting to criminalize the activities of the accused were 
well intentioned; however, the defendant’s conduct simply did not fit within the 
language of the statute the defendant was charged with violating.4 
The Robertson opinion highlights the problem that many courts are facing in our 
highly evolving technological world: a defendant’s conduct that on first impression 
appears wrong but does not actually violate a current criminal statute. Rather than 
wait for a legislature to step in and criminalize the activity, prosecutors attempt to 
use existing laws to punish the otherwise legal conduct. This is not a new problem; 
prosecutors have faced this challenge ever since we moved from a criminal justice 
system that was based on the common law to one that is statute-based. 
For example, in Keeler v. Superior Court, the defendant was originally convicted 
of murder for the death of an unborn, but viable, fetus.5 The Court was asked to 
decide whether a viable fetus fit within the definition of a “human being” because 
Penal Code Section 187 provided that murder was the unlawful killing of a “human 
being” with malice aforethought. The prosecution argued the following: 
[T]he sciences of obstetrics and pediatrics have greatly progressed since 
1872, to the point where with proper medical care a normally developed 
fetus prematurely born at 28 weeks or more has an excellent chance of 
survival, i.e., is “viable”; that the common law requirement of live birth 
to prove the fetus had become a “human being” who may be the victim 
of murder is no longer in accord with scientific fact, since an unborn but 
viable fetus is now fully capable of independent life; and that one who 
unlawfully and maliciously terminates such a life should therefore be 
liable to prosecution for murder under section 187.6  
While the court was sympathetic to the prosecutor’s arguments (and certainly the 
defendant was no boy scout; he allegedly told the victim he was going to stomp the 
fetus out of her), the Court nevertheless felt bound by the fact that under California 
law, no acts are criminal except those that are “prescribed or authorized by this 
Code.”7 The Court then reminded the reader (presumably prosecutors and 
legislatures) that the Court will not create laws; in essence, common law crimes are 
rejected. The Court also proceeded to quote Justice Marshall in his exhortation 
against courts punishing behavior by analogous statutes:  
Chief Justice Marshall warned long ago, “It would be dangerous, indeed, 
to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief 
 
 
 4. The Court concluded that “[a]t the core of the Commonwealth’s argument . . . is the 
proposition that a woman, and in particular a woman riding on a public trolley, has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in not having a stranger secretly take photographs up her 
skirt. The proposition is eminently reasonable, but § 105 (b) in its current form does not 
address it.” Commonwealth, 5 N.E.3d at 529. 
 5. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
 6. Id. at 624. 
 7. Id. 
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of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not 
enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred 
character, with those which are enumerated.”8 
The Court then went on to exhort against judicial legislation: 
For a court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time has now come 
to prosecute under section 187 one who kills an unborn but viable fetus 
would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the guise of construing it. 
Nor does a need to fill an asserted “gap” in the law between abortion and 
homicide—as will appear, no such gap in fact exists—justify judicial 
legislation of this nature: to make it “a judicial function ‘to explore such 
new fields of crime as they may appear from time to time’ is wholly 
foreign to the American concept of criminal justice” and “raises very 
serious questions concerning the principle of separation of powers.9  
The Keeler decision highlights the current problem surrounding the growth in 
potential criminal activity that has emerged in the digital age. Like the Keeler Court, 
courts today are faced with prosecutions under criminal provisions that might govern 
the defendant’s conduct, but only if the court is willing to stretch the definition of the 
offense. How are courts to deal with these issues, while remaining true to the fact 
that the American criminal justice system follows the rule that legislatures, not the 
courts, create criminal law? 
The courts have used many of the tried-and-true techniques to try and determine 
if a particular action fits within a specific statute. Specifically, courts have used plain 
meaning, turning to common sense interpretation, usually by looking at a dictionary, 
or if available, the legislative history of a provision. When that fails, appellate courts 
have sent a message back to the legislature—usually by refusing to apply an old law 
to a new crime—with the hopes that the legislature will legislate in response to a 
“new” crime. 
In California, the legislature received the Keeler Court’s decision loud and clear. 
After the Keeler decision was handed down, the California legislature amended Penal 
Code section 187 to include the word “fetus” within the definition of murder.10 
Given the hesitancy courts have to interpret criminal statutes broadly,11 the next 
section of this Article will explore how courts have attempted to use the standard 
 
 
 8. Id. at 625 (citing (United States v. Wiltberger (1820) 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96, 5 
L.Ed. 37.). Some legislatures have specifically enacted legislation prohibiting “extending by 
analogy.” For example in Louisiana §14.3 of the Louisiana Criminal Code says “The articles 
of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; 
however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions 
shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their 
usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” 
La. Stat. Ann. § 14.3 (2019). 
 9. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 625–26 (cleaned up). 
 10. Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (West 2019) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human 
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”). 
 11. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (“The dividing line 
between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held 
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methods of interpreting statutes to try to get at the plain meaning of a criminal statute 
and apply it in circumstances where new technologies are being forced to fit in “old 
laws.” As we shall see, these methods are often ill-equipped to meet the challenges 
posed by new technologies, and they often lead to inconsistent results, further 
strengthening the need for legislatures to enact legislation specifically addressed to 
new technologies. 
II.  COURTS’ ATTEMPTS AT USING EXISTING STATUTES TO FIT “NEW CRIMES.” 
Traditionally, legislatures call upon courts to look to the plain language of a 
statute in order to give it the ordinary meaning that would be understood by the public 
at large.12 This is especially true in the criminal context, where the rule of lenity13 
calls for a strict construction of statutes,14 usually in favor of the defendant.15 
Drafting statutes in as plain a manner as possible aids the courts in their interpretation 
of statutes. Yet, even with such rules in force, courts are often left with the challenge 
of determining how a particular statute should, or should not, apply to a defendant’s 
actions in a given case. While many different methods of statutory construction may 
be used, two of the most consistently-applied methods are (1) using a dictionary to 
seek the ordinary meaning of the words found in the statute, and (2) looking at the 
intent behind the statute by examining the statute’s legislative history. As we shall 
see, neither of these methods are well-designed to deal with the issues that arise when 
 
 
to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will 
reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain 
foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the 
ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. 
Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their 
violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one 
conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.”) 
 12. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 8.3a (West 2018) (“All words and phrases shall be 
construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language . . . 
.”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1.42 (LexisNexis 2018) (“Words and phrases shall be read in 
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); Tex. Gov’t 
Code Ann § 311.011(a) (West 2018) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and 
construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”). 
 13. “The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendants subjected to them.” United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (citing 
United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 
27 (1931); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971)).  
 14. “The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old 
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; 
and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the 
judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain 
its punishment.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). 
 15. See, e.g., Ohio. Rev. Code. Ann. § 2901.04(A) (LexisNexis 2017) (“Except as 
otherwise provided in division (C) or (D) of this section, sections of the Revised Code defining 
offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in 
favor of the accused.”). 
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a court is forced to look at purported crimes that arise, in part, because of evolving 
technologies. 
Enshrined in most states’ statutes is a dictate that courts are to use common sense 
when interpreting a statute.16  Some common-sense language practices used by 
legislatures to guide courts are “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and 
construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage,”17 and “[w]ords 
and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved use of the 
language.”18 How then should courts determine what common usage is? Many courts 
turn to an ordinary dictionary of the English language to help guide them. 
While not every legal scholar19 or judge20 may agree on the wisdom of using 
dictionaries to determine plain meaning or common usage, the fact is that they are 
being used by judges in an attempt to interpret statutes in ways that do not invent or 
create new law. The United States Supreme Court, and many lower courts,  
frequently use dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of a word.21 
 
 
 16. See supra note 12 
 17. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101 (West 2019). 
 18. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-213 (2019). 
 19. “[W]hen faced with what they take to be a lexical problem, some justices and judges 
resort to dictionaries in what, as will become clear, is generally a vain attempt to find the 
correct statutory meanings. The first mistake these justices and judges, and many legal scholars 
for that matter, make is blithely to assume that dictionaries are sound sources for word 
meanings, although the fact dictionaries often differ should have given them pause. In contrast, 
linguistic scholars who specialize in lexical semantics appear to be unanimously agreed that 
dictionaries are not reliable sources for word meanings. Anyone who takes the time to work 
out the meaning of a word along the principles outlined by Paul Ziff, Anna Wierzbicka, and 
other experts in lexical semantics can confirm that fact for themselves. So we are treated to 
the truly absurd spectacle of august justices and judges arguing over which unreliable 
dictionary and which unreliable dictionary definition should be deemed authoritative.”  
J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomena to Federal Statutory Interpretation: Identifying the Sources 
of Interpretive Problems, 76 Miss. L.J. 55, 64-66 (2006). 
 20. “Dictionary definitions of the word ‘licensing’ are, as the majority points out, broad 
enough to include virtually any permission that the State chooses to call a ‘license.’ But neither 
dictionary definitions nor the use of the word “license” in an unrelated statute can demonstrate 
what scope Congress intended the word “licensing” to have as it used that word in this federal 
statute. Instead, statutory context must ultimately determine the word’s coverage.” Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 612 (2011) (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(emphasis in original) (cleaned up). See also “I want to reemphasize what should be obvious. 
‘Plain meaning’ as a way to understand language is silly. In interesting cases, meaning is not 
‘plain’; it must be imputed; and the choice among meanings must have a footing more solid 
that a dictionary—which is a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means to 
decode the work of legislatures.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in 
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994). 
 21. A number of studies have been conducted with the purpose of tracking how often the 
courts turn to dictionaries in their judicial opinions. One such study found that the Supreme 
Court cited to dictionaries 58 times in the Court’s October 2010 term. Bezalel Stern, Nonlegal 
Citations and the Failure of Law: A Case Study of the Supreme Court 2010-11 Term, 35 
WHITTIER L. REV. 79, 101 (2013). An earlier study found that the Supreme Court cited to 
general dictionaries 271 times in the 1989-1998 terms. John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: 
Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427, 432 (2002). This 
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As courts are more frequently being asked to interpret statutes as they apply to 
new and evolving technologies, courts are often left with little guidance from the 
legislatures that are often far behind in dealing with technological change. Turning 
to reliable sources, such as dictionaries, is one way for a court to use common sense 
in its efforts to align current law with new activities. Yet even then, as we will see 
below in the Espinoza case, courts within the same jurisdiction can come to opposite 
conclusions of what the “plain language” of a penal statute means, thus reinforcing 
the need for legislatures to address new crimes, rather than leave that function to the 
courts. 
In State v. Espinoza,22 the court was faced with a defendant who was charged with 
unlawfully engaging in business as a money-services business and of money 
laundering. The defendant engaged in trading in the virtual currency Bitcoin, and he 
claimed that his use of Bitcoin did not fall under either of the statutes prosecutors 
charged him with violating.23 Because the court was called upon to interpret the 
statutes (which, of course, did not mention or anticipate Bitcoin when they were 
drafted), the court looked first to general canons of statutory construction. Following 
the traditional approach, the court opined that “[w]hen construing the meaning of a 
statute, the courts must first look to its plain language.”24  
The court was stuck wrestling with whether a seller of Bitcoin fell under the 
definition of a “money transmitter” within the statute’s meaning. The court used 
Black’s Law Dictionary to determine what the term “transmit” meant, deciding that 
the dictionary definition of the term did not encompass the defendant’s conduct. In a 
not-so-subtle message to the legislature, the court concluded the section of the 
opinion dealing with the regulation of “money services business” with the following 
admonition: “The Florida Legislature may choose to adopt statutes regulating virtual 
currency in the future. At this time, however, attempting to fit the sale of Bitcoin into 
a statutory scheme regulating money services businesses is like fitting a square peg 
in a round hole.”25 
While the trial court looked to a dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of the 
statute, which clearly was not designed to cover virtual currencies, the appellate court 
decided the matter a different way.26 The appellate court began its decision with an 
acknowledgment that the Florida statutes did not mention virtual currencies or 
Bitcoin anywhere in the relevant sections; however, the appellate court, in looking at 




author ran the following search in the LexisNexis database for all federal cases that cited a 
dictionary in 2019 and found that courts had cited dictionaries 848 times: “oxford english 
dictionary” or (webster’s /s dictionary) or (“random house” /s dictionary) or “merriam-
webster’s”. 
 22. State v. Espinoza, No. F2014-002923, 2016 WL 11613849, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 
25, 2016). 
 23. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 560.125(a) and § 896.101(5)(a)–(b) (West 2019). 
 24. Espinoza, 2016 WL 11613849, at *4. 
 25. Id. at *5. 
 26. State v. Espinoza, 264 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. App. 3d 2019). 
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The issue for our determination under Count 1 is whether, based on the 
undisputed facts, Espinoza was acting as a payment instrument seller or 
engaging in the business of a money transmitter, either of which require 
registration as a money services business under Florida law. Given the 
plain language of the Florida statutes governing money services 
businesses and the nature of Bitcoin and how it functions, Espinoza was 
acting as both.27 
In rejecting the lower court’s decision that Bitcoin did not qualify under the 
statute, the appellate court looked at federal cases that had considered how to treat 
Bitcoin. Once again, we see the courts attempting to look at plain meaning, and using 
dictionaries to determine said meaning. The appellate court quoted from a federal 
district court, that itself quoted from the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
when trying to define what qualified as “money” under federal law.28 
The Espinoza cases provide a good example of the deficiencies of leaving it up to 
courts to pigeonhole new activities into existing criminal statutes. Try as they might, 
the “plain language” of statutes, even with the use of aids like dictionaries, do not 
lead to consistent results.  
The Robertson case, mentioned in Part I of this Article, provides another useful 
example of a court trying to use the plain meaning of a statute, coupled with a 
dictionary, to fit a “new” activity into an existing criminal statute. At issue in 
Robertson was whether G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b) (§ 105 [b]), which prohibits secretly 
photographing or videotaping a person “who is nude or partially nude” in certain 
circumstances, includes ‘upskirting.’29 The defendant was accused of aiming his 
cellular telephone camera at the crotch area of a seated female passenger and 
attempted secretly to photograph or videotape a visual image of the area in violation 
of § 105 (b). The defendant’s contention was that the statute did not criminalize his 
conduct. At the time, the statute section read as follows: 
Whoever willfully photographs, videotapes or electronically surveils 
another person who is nude or partially nude, with the intent to secretly 
conduct or hide such activity, when the other person in such place and 
circumstance would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not 
being so photographed, videotaped or electronically surveilled, and 
without that person’s knowledge and consent, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years or 
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.30 
The defendant admitted that he attempted to photograph a person with his cellular 
telephone camera, he did so secretly with the intent to hide such conduct, and he did 
so without the knowledge or consent of the victim. The defendant’s main argument 
turned on the other elements of the crime, including that the victim was not “nude or 
 
 
 27. Id. at 1062. 
 28. Id. at 1067 (quoting United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014)). 
 29. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 523 (Mass. 2014).  
 30. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 105(b) (West 2009). 
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partially nude,” and that the MBTA train was not a place where the victim had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy not to be “so photographed.” The court was left 
trying to fit the defendant’s conduct into the statute currently in place. The court 
looked to the plain meaning of the words of the statute to see if it could fit the 
defendant’s actions into the statute’s words. 
Turning first to the language of the statute, “[a]nother person who is nude or 
partially nude,” the court reminded the reader that when determining what a statute 
means, the focus should be on the actual meaning of the language used by the 
legislature.31 Looking at Section 105(a), where the legislature defined “[p]artially 
nude” as “the exposure of the human genitals, buttocks, pubic area or female breast 
below a point immediately above the top of the areola,” the court noted that: 
“Exposure” is not defined in the statute, but is generally defined as “an 
act of exposing,” “a condition or instance of being laid bare or exposed 
to view.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 802 (2002). 
“Expose,” in turn, means “to lay open to view; lay bare; make known,” 
with “display” and “exhibit” noted as synonyms. Id. See American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 626 (4th ed. 2006) 
(defining “expose” as “to make visible”).32 
With these definitions, the court then looked to the word “is” and reviewed the 
canons of statutory construction to determine how to understand “is” in the context 
of the legislation: 
[T]his person who is partially nude should be defined with reference to 
the other category of person included in the same sentence, namely, “a 
person who is nude.” See 2A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes 
and Statutory Construction § 47:16, at 352-353 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“ordinarily the coupling of words denotes an intention that they should 
be understood in the same general sense”). See also Commonwealth v. 
Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 428, 319 N.E.2d 901 (1974) (“words in a statute 
must be considered in light of the other words surrounding them”). Just 
as “a person who is nude” is commonly understood to mean a person 
who is not wearing any clothes, so, in this context, we understand “a 
person who is . . . partially nude” to denote a person who is not wearing 
any clothes covering one or more of the parts of the body listed in the 
definition of that term,33 
Based on this reading of the statute, the court determined that the defendant had 
not photographed someone who was partially nude, as the victim still had clothing 
on over her genital area. 
Next, the defendant argued that he did not violate the section of the statute that 
stated “[i]n such place and circumstance [where the person] would have a reasonable 
 
 
 31. The court cites International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (Mass. 1983) 
(“the primary source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute”). 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 526-27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 527-28. 
74 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT [Vol. 95:066 
 
expectation of privacy in not being so photographed.” The court referred back to its 
analysis of “a person who . . . is partially nude,” to point out that the victim in this 
case was not “partially nude.” Once again, the court was left to determine, based on 
the exact language of the statute, whether the defendant’s conduct fell within the 
statute’s purview:  
However, we discuss briefly the fourth statutory element of the crime, 
namely, that the person being photographed “in such place and 
circumstance would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not 
being so photographed.” The defendant argues that this language means 
that the person must be in a private place or a location where a person 
“would normally have privacy from uninvited observation.” As such, 
because the MBTA is a public transit system operating in a public place 
and uses cameras, the two alleged victims here were not in a place and 
circumstance where they reasonably would or could have had an 
expectation of privacy. The Commonwealth argues that the defendant’s 
proffered interpretation restricts § 105 (b)’s application to private places, 
and there is no such limiting language in the statute. It reads the statutory 
phrase, “reasonable expectation of privacy in not being so 
photographed” (emphasis added), as focusing less on the location where 
the photographing occurs than the location on the body that is the subject 
of that photograph. It argues that because a female MBTA passenger has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in not having the area of her body 
underneath her skirt photographed, which she demonstrates by wearing 
the skirt, the defendant's conduct falls within § 105 (b). 
 
We disagree with the Commonwealth’s reading. The word “so” in the 
phrase, “so photographed,” clearly is used referentially—that is, it serves 
to refer back to preceding language in the subsection addressing or 
describing the act of photographing. The preceding descriptive language 
in the section is the following: “Whoever willfully photographs . . . 
another person who is nude or partially nude, with the intent to secretly 
conduct or hide such activity . . . .” G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b). See 
Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620, 624, 977 N.E.2d 536 (2012) 
(applying rules of grammar to interpret statute). Thus, it follows that the 
“so photographed” language in connection with the “place and 
circumstance” language requires that the person being photographed be 
in a state of complete (“nude”) or partial (“partially nude”) undress, and 
present in a place, private or not, where in the particular circumstances 
she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being willfully 
and secretly photographed while in that state.34 
The court acknowledged that the purpose of the statute was to proscribe what was 
once called “Peeping Tom” behavior, especially as enhanced by newer technologies. 
The court even expressed sympathy for what the prosecutors were trying to do:  
[a]t the core of the Commonwealth’s argument to the contrary is the 
proposition that a woman, and in particular a woman riding on a public 
 
 
 34. Id. at 528–529. 
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trolley, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in not having a stranger 
secretly take photographs up her skirt. The proposition is eminently 
reasonable, but § 105 (b) in its current form does not address it.35 
In a footnote, the court went further and sent an explicit message to the legislature. 
In the concluding footnote of the opinion, the court wrote: 
Other States, recognizing that women have such an expectation of 
privacy, have enacted provisions specifically criminalizing the type of 
upskirting the defendant is alleged to have attempted. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. 
§ 810.145(2)(c) (2013) (“A person commits the offense of video 
voyeurism if that person . . . [f]or the amusement, entertainment, sexual 
arousal, gratification, or profit of oneself or another, or on behalf of 
oneself or another, intentionally uses an imaging device to secretly view, 
broadcast, or record under or through the clothing being worn by another 
person, without that person’s knowledge and consent, for the purpose of 
viewing the body of, or the undergarment worn by, that person’); N.Y. 
Penal Law § 250.45(4) (McKinney 2008) (“A person is guilty of 
unlawful surveillance in the second degree when . . . [w]ithout the 
knowledge or consent of a person, he or she intentionally uses or installs, 
or permits the utilization or installation of an imaging device to 
surreptitiously view, broadcast or record, under the clothing being worn 
by such person, the sexual or other intimate parts of such person”). 
 
We note, without analysis of them, that in the past legislative session, 
proposed amendments to § 105 were before the Legislature that appeared 
to attempt to address the upskirting conduct at issue here. See 2013 
Senate Doc. No. 648; 2013 House Doc. No. 1231.”36 
The court’s not-so-subtle message to the legislature that it would not legislate to 
create new crimes by fitting new behavior into existing statutes was heard by the 
legislature, which subsequently amended Section 105 by adding language that 
“plainly” covered upskirting.37 
While the Massachusetts Legislature acted to criminalize upskirting, other 
jurisdictions have been much slower to amend their criminal codes to keep up with 
new technologically-enabled crimes. In Connecticut, for example, the legislature, in 
response to the Robertson decision, attempted to amend its statutes to criminalize 
upskirting. In looking at the issue (along with other criminal acts that technology is 
 
 
 35. Id. at 529. 
 36. Id. at 529 n.17. 
 37. The following paragraph was added to section 105(b) a year after the Robertson 
opinion was decided: “Whoever willfully photographs, videotapes or electronically surveils, 
with the intent to secretly conduct or hide such activity, the sexual or other intimate parts of a 
person under or around the person’s clothing to view or attempt to view the person’s sexual 
or other intimate parts when a reasonable person would believe that the person’s sexual or 
other intimate parts would not be visible to the public and without the person’s knowledge and 
consent, shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 
years or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both fine and imprisonment.” Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. 272, § 105(b) (West 2019). 
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making easier to perpetrate), the Joint Judiciary Committee commented that the “new 
language reflects the ongoing development of technology.”38 Yet, despite the 
support, the legislature failed to act in the 2014 legislative session and re-raised the 
issue in 2015.39 Once again, however, the legislation did not pass, and it did not 
reappear until 2019. At that time, it finally passed the legislature and was signed by 
the Governor.40 Presumably, a court looking at the legislative history of the law in 
effect prior to 2019 would have been of no help to the court in deciding whether it 
covered “upskirting,” thus leaving the courts to try and fend for themselves in 
determining whether “upskirting” fit under the existing “Peeping Tom” statutes. 
Conversely, in New Jersey, a defendant attempted to use Robertson to argue that 
the New Jersey statute under which he was charged did not cover upskirting.41 In 
that case, the defendant showed that certain members of the New Jersey legislature 
introduced bills to clarify that upskirting was indeed a crime in New Jersey. That 
legislation failed to pass the legislature, and the defendant therefore argued that this 
indicated that upskirting was not covered by the statute under which he was 
charged.42 
The court pushed back, ruling that failure to amend a statute does not, in and of 
itself, prove that a piece of legislation does not already cover the at-issue activity. 
The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the failure to adopt an amendment can, at times, 
indicate a conscious decision to reject the amendment's provisions, such inaction 
conversely may signal that the law as written already achieves the sought-after 
objective.”43 
Once again, we see the court trying to determine the meaning of an existing statute 
by resorting to a dictionary, even when the legislature tried, unsuccessfully, to amend 
the statute so courts would not need to resort to statutory interpretation to fit newer 
 
 
 38. H.B. 5586 (Conn. 2014). 
 39. H.B. 6921 (Conn. 2015). 
 40. Raised B. 1100, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019).  
 41. State v. Nicholson, 169 A.3d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “Defendant first 
cites a failed attempt in the 216th Legislature to amend N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(b) (2004) in response 
to Robertson. In 2014, a senator introduced a bill which sought to add a third-degree offense 
penalizing the photographing or filming of “the image of another person’s intimate parts under 
or around the person’s clothing” and to provide that the definition of “intimate parts” applied 
“whether clothed of unclothed.” S. Bill. No. 1847, 216th Leg., at 3–4 (Mar. 24, 2014). The 
senator’s statement accompanying the bill stated: “This bill clarifies that it is a crime under 
this State’s invasion of privacy law to secretly photograph underneath a person’s clothing. 
Referred to as ‘upskirting,’ this practice occurs when perpetrators use their cell phones to take 
pictures and record video under the skirts and dresses of unsuspecting victims[.]” Statement 
to S. Bill No. 1847, 216th Leg., at 5 (Mar. 24, 2014) (emphasis added). The senator stated: In 
response to a court decision ruling that upskirting was not illegal, a state law was recently 
enacted in Massachusetts criminalizing the practice. It is the sponsor’s intent to similarly 
protect women in this State from the vile and degrading practice of upskirting by making it 
clear that it constitutes an invasion of privacy under criminal and civil law.” Id. at 998-99. 
 42.  Nicholson, 169 A.3d at 999 (“We reject defendant's claim that the unsuccessful bills 
show N.J.S.A. 2C:14–9(b) (2004) did not already prohibit upskirting where the victim's 
intimate parts were visible.”) 
 43. Id. at 18 (citation omitted). 
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crimes into existing laws.44 Ultimately, the court found no ambiguity and ruled that 
upskirting was covered by the plain language of the existing statutes. While the 
legislature was unsuccessful in amending its statute to specifically address the new 
crime of upskirting, it should be applauded for moving in the right direction and not 
simply allowing the courts to fend for themselves in figuring out the “plain” meaning 
of the statute as it applied to newer technologies and the law. 
III.  BACK TO THE COMMON LAW AS AN ANSWER? 
In Australia, the courts have taken a different approach to the slow response of 
legislatures in criminalizing new, technology-enhanced crimes. While this response 
may work in Australia, it is not one that this author recommends as a solution in the 
United States. In Australia, the courts have appeared to be more willing to stretch 
the interpretation of statutes in order to encompass emerging technologies without 
waiting for the legislature to act. As technology evolves and as the world changes, 
the Australian High Court offered a way for courts to look at new, tech-enabled 
crimes and interpret statutes in a way that meets the intent of the legislature, even if 
the statute’s words do not appear to cover a defendant’s conduct. 
In Project Blue Sky Inc. v Australian Broadcasting Authority, the High Court of 
Australia, in interpreting a statute, wrote the following: 
[T]he duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the 
meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. 
Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the 
grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of 
the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the 
purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the 
words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not 
correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.45  
The court went on to reference Statutory Interpretation, by Francis Bennion, 
quoting: 
The distinction between literal and legal meaning lies at the heart of the 
problem of statutory interpretation. An enactment consists of a verbal 
formula. Unless defectively worded, this has a grammatical meaning in 
itself. The unwary reader of this formula (particularly if not a lawyer) 
may mistakenly conclude that the grammatical meaning is all that is of 
concern. If that were right, there would be little need for books on 
statutory interpretation. Indeed, so far as concerns law embodied in 
statute, there would scarcely be a need for law books of any kind. 
Unhappily this state of being able to rely on grammatical meaning does 
not prevail in the realm of statute law; nor is it likely to. In some cases 
 
 
 44. “Thus, the 2016 amendment extended the coverage of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(b) by making 
it a fourth-degree offense to photograph or film ‘undergarment-clad intimate parts’ without 
requiring they be visible. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(b)(2) (2016); see Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary,(defining ‘clad’ as ‘being covered or clothed’).” Id. at 19 (cleaned up). 
 45.  (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 (Austl.). 
78 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT [Vol. 95:066 
 
the grammatical meaning, when applied to the facts of the instant case, 
is ambiguous. Furthermore there needs to be brought to the grammatical 
meaning of an enactment due consideration of the relevant matters drawn 
from the context (using that term in its widest sense). Consideration of 
the enactment in its context may raise factors that pull in different ways. 
For example the desirability of applying the clear literal meaning may 
conflict with the fact that this does not remedy the mischief that 
Parliament intended to deal with.46 
While the Australian model may give courts some latitude in addressing the 
problem of fitting new crimes into old laws, it pushes back against the bedrock of the 
American criminal justice system and takes the pressure off of legislatures to do their 
job—that is, create law to regulate society. The better solution is to remain with our 
legal system and the separation between courts and legislatures, maintain the 
harmony of balance within our criminal system, and force legislatures to remedy 
problems that new technologies introduce into the criminal system. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Technology will continue to rush forward, and those with ill intent will seek to 
use technology to pursue their own ends. The criminal justice system must deal with 
these criminals, and law enforcement must use the laws in force at the time of the 
purported offense in order to do so. As we have seen above, using the traditional 
elements of statutory interpretation, courts are both ill equipped to interpret and 
unwilling to stretch the meaning of existing laws to cover new technology-enabled 
wrongdoing.  
The courts are correct in standing (largely) firm behind the rule of law that puts 
the creation of criminal laws in the hands of the legislatures. Unless we are willing 
to either return to the days of common law crimes or expand the interpretation powers 
of the courts, legislatures must enact new laws that encompass the activities 
associated with new technologies. Only the legislature can, and should, be tasked 
with creating these laws. The judiciary is, rightly so, loathe to step in and create new 
crimes, and even when it sees wrongdoing, the interpretive tools available to the 





 46. 3rd ed (1997), pp 343-344. 
